By Abba Dukawa
“I strayed into (Ojukwu’s) office while looking for Lt-Colonel David Ejoor the General Staff Officer 1 (GSO 1) on some urgent professional matters. Ejoor was not in his office or anywhere else that I could easily have found him. By chance, I went to check for him in the office of the Quartermaster General. Ejoor was there, as were Ojukwu who sat behind his desk and Colonel (Victor) Banjo. From their countenance and the way they sat, it was obvious they had been engaged in serious discussions before I walked into the office. Ojukwu first saw me and before I could say what brought me to his office – looking for the GO 1 – he said cheerily: ‘Oh, Jack, we’ve been looking for you, where have you been?’
“The way he said ‘we’ confirmed my guess that they had been discussing something topical. I told him I had been looking all around for Ejoor but could not find him until I chanced upon him in his (Ojukwu’s) office. He offered me a seat, but I chose to remain standing. I asked why he and the others needed to see me. Without beating about the bush, he said they had been reviewing the conflict between Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the President and Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister and de facto head of government. This was no news to me or to anyone who had been following political developments in Nigeria at the time. It was common knowledge that the just concluded general elections of December 1964 had been deadlocked and neither Azikiwe nor Balewa was willing to yield an inch to the other in their political contest. The “Zik sacks Balewa” and “Balewa sacks Zik” scenario that ensued dominated the occasion.
“These two had a long history that was rooted in the race for the control of Nigeria by any of the three Regions in the country. Political historians have copiously documented the cause and course of how Zik and Balewa, who represented the East and the North respectively, could not make the alliance between their respective parties work. It did not matter much that their arch-rival, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1987) of the Western Region, was in prison in Calabar and, notionally, had severely limited political influence. But it is safe to say that the discussions, which I later gathered started between Ojukwu and Banjo, centred on seeking ways to intervene to break the logjam. This fact alone indicated the extent to which the relationship between Zik and Balewa had deteriorated. The two military officers (Ojukwu and Banjo) reasoned that if the military did not intervene, one way or the other, particularly in favouring Zik in the unfolding political drama, we might eventually be blamed for whatever happened to the young Nigeria.
“I paid a bit more attention to the argument Ojukwu marshalled. I had always known him to be politically savvy. The same, too, could be said of Banjo, whose high-level political sophistication coloured his perspectives, ruined his military career and eventually cost him his life in the hands of his compatriot, Ojukwu. Both men appeared too eager to join the political fray. Ejoor’s position was the one I could not situate in the political context, as it seemed that he had only been invited by the duo. This was when it struck me that something ominous was in the air. On a deeper reflection, it occurred to me that the basis of the invitation that Ojukwu had cheerfully extended to me was premised on the need to create the picture of a broad-based, ‘national’ military action that was supported by elements from the nation’s four Regions: Ojukwu from the East, Banjo from the West, Ejoor from the Mid-West and I from the North. The concurrence of a Northerner was needed to close the loop. To them, I represented the missing link of the jigsaw puzzle, hence the welcoming invitation to me to join in.
“From all indications, they had reviewed the issues at stake and had concluded that their interests, whatever these were, would be best served by military intervention on the side of the President so that Zik could take effective control of government. I did not feel comfortable with the subject of their discussion and strongly disagreed with their conclusion for the simple reason that both ran contrary to known military traditions, particularly in respect of the role of the military in society. I questioned their loyalty and military discipline. We were all trained to be officers in a disciplined Army that was loyal and supportive of the political leadership, that is, the government of the day irrespective of the political party in control. Certainly, we were not trained to be ambitious enough to try to supplant the will of the people.”
He said he believed the military needed to be loyal to the prime minister “who was the substantive Head of Government in the Parliamentary system that we operated. For me, therefore, any intervention on behalf of Zik, who we all respected but knew was a ceremonial President, was questionable because it would have amounted to a military-aided civilian take-over of government. Was this their intention or was it a camouflage for a military coup?”
Excerpts from My Life of Duty and Allegiance, a book by Yakubu Gowon, former Head of State.
